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Brave New World? 
The global financial crisis’ impact on Scandinavian Banking’s sales rhetoric and practices  
Abstract  
The paper explores how the global financial crisis wrought changes in the financial industry, 
even far from the crisis’ epicentre, in sales orientation, rhetoric and practices. We draw on 
accounts from managers and employees gleaned from a strategic sample of Scandinavian 
financial institutions. Framing our analysis in terms of Meyer’s (1982) concept of 
environmental jolts, we identified a genealogical shift in accounts in relation to sales as the 
context changed: there was a transition from an early stress on blame games, through the 
nurturing of a more conceptual plurivocality, culminating in embellishment. Initially bankers 
blamed external actors and factors. Their rhetoric changed when they had to confront 
customer’s complaints about overselling and mis-selling as well as critiques from regulatory 
authorities. A new discourse emerged focused on “right selling” and changes in sales practices 
but one still constituted in terms of the pressure to sell.  











There are many diverse scientific accounts on the global financial crises (GFC) (e.g. Knights, 
2013, McDonald & Robinson, 2009, Roubini & Mihm, 2010, Stiglitz, 2010, Whittle & 
Mueller, 2011). None have focused on it as a longitudinal process with everyday effects played 
out discursively. We investigate the crisis through accounts of changing financial cultures and 
conditions in Norway (authors, Engelstad 2013, The Financial Supervisory Authority, 2008-
2013; 2014).  
Traditionally, banks proud to be considered trustworthy lent money to customers after careful 
consideration of risks and the possibility of losses on a case-by-case basis based on local 
knowledge (Courpasson, 2006). Global deregulation, digital technology and increasing 
financialization changed the old world of finance (Reinhardt & Rogoff, 2009; Zúniga-Vicente 
et al. 2005). Local knowledge was increasingly displaced by technical competence with 
computer programmes, aggressive selling tactics and a more meritocratic ethos (McDowell, 
1997, McDonald & Robinson, 2009). The ‘financialization’ of the global economy (Epstein, 
2005; Røyrvik, 2011; Clegg et al., 2011) saw the key markets of London and New York, the 
City and Wall Street (Ho, 2009) become centres of the newly liberalized system of global flows 
of capital (Harvey, 2005; Foster & Magdoff, 2009; Arrighi, 1994; Duménil & Levy, 2004; 
Alexander, Dhumale & Eatwell, 2005; Schinasi, 2005; Krugman, 2007). Credit derivatives 
were introduced, allowing risks to be turned into financial products that could be sold as shares 
or bonds (Tett, 2009; Ouroussoff, 2010). The structured finance investment vehicles provided 
financial institutions with opportunities to write swaps or options that provided them with 
regular payments in exchange for taking another’s risk of default. With these changing 
conditions, front-line staff shifted from being ‘tellers to sellers’ (Regini, Kitay & Baethge, 




and complex new products with higher proposed yield were developed. Initially marketed to 
corporate clients as ‘low risk’, later they were sold to ordinary retail customers (authors).  
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 jolted the finance industry (see for instance Stiglitz, 
2009; Perrow, 2010). The term ‘jolts’, comes from Meyer (1982: 515), who  coined the term 
environmental jolts to capture the nature of unexpected, unplanned and uncertainty-inducing 
events. He defined these jolts as “transient perturbations whose occurrences are difficult to 
foresee and whose impact on organizations are disruptive and potentially inimical” (p. 515). 
The term was used “to distinguish external events from disparate interpretations within 
organizations such as opportunities, threats, crises, or catastrophes”. Meyer underscored jolts as 
constituted by events whose reception is always ambiguous. In a case study of strategic 
managers in hospitals, Meyer concluded that jolts acquire their meanings from embedded 
ideologies that determined whether jolts were perceived as dilemmas, opportunities, or 
aberrations.  
In our case, in the tradition of attending to the everyday cultures of finance (see, for instance, 
Ho, 2009; Whittle & Mueller, 2011), we analyse longitudinal and ethnographic data to ask: 1) 
How did financial enterprises frame sales rhetoric and practices before the GFC? 2) How did 
financial enterprises respond to the critiques that arose after the GFC? 3) What attempts did 
financial enterprises make to rebuild image and trust in the wake of these post GFC critiques? 
After describing our data sources and methods, we will present the empirical section covering 
the trajectory of sales rhetoric and practices before, during and after the GFC.  





When the global financial crisis occurred, we were conducting a study on sales cultures in 
finance. The turmoil made some processes related to sales more visible , but several 
negotiations about research collaboration came to an abrupt halt. Seemingly in limbo, in 2008, 
one author was invited to give a talk at a seminar on Human Resources organized by the 
Norwegian Employers’ Association for Financial Services. Network contacts from the seminar 
and our previous research in finance helped us construct a sample of six Nordic players. We 
were also able to draw on empirical data from previous projects undertaken before the crisis, 





For this paper we mostly draw on data from four banks. Two of them come from a large Nordic 
financial service group with an emphasis on retail banking, offering a full range of financial 
services in several European countries. Its market position made it vulnerable to the crisis and it 
suffered greater economic losses than comparable regional institutions, making it an exemplary 
case (Flyvbjerg, Landman & Schram, 2012). In addition, data from two saving banks in a 
Norwegian alliance less exposed to the economic effects of the global crisis, is included. To 
strengthen validity, we selected supplementary complementary cases: another major Nordic 
financial services group, one Norwegian financial services group, and one Norwegian and one 
Nordic insurance company. Due to reasons of anonymity, the names and further details of the 
cases are not provided – a prerequisite for gathering data.   
Sample and data gathering 
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We have published results on this research previously (authors), hence, especially due to length considerations, 




We followed an iterative process moving between empirical data, interpretations and 
theoretical frameworks (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000, Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The data 
gathering included various techniques and proceeded through a series of iterative steps (see 
tables in appendix).  
During 1996-2000 (Author) we collected data from customer advisors and customer 
representatives on the introduction and cultivation of sales orientation, and interviewed a 
strategic sample of managers in a Norwegian saving bank (Case2, Bank C, Table A.1). Data 
material on sales and customer interaction were further developed and analysed in 2003-2005. 
In 2006-2007, we conducted a comparative case study in three customer centres in Norway in a 
Nordic insurance company exploring the dilemmas and ambivalences in sales (table A.2).  
The data covering the situation post crisis was collected between 2008 and 2014 in a strategic 
sample of financial institutions operating in Norway and Denmark (hence Scandinavian in the 
title of the paper). The sample was selected from those managers responsible for strategic or 
operational issues related to sales. We gathered narrative data from other managers at meetings 
and in-house seminars. We also made appointments with shop stewards (previously financial 
advisors), who play a key role within the Nordic model of industrial relations. We saw these 
informants discuss the impact of the crisis in various public fora, in which they were challenged 
to make public sense of the unfolding events in terms of their implications for employees/union 
members, which provided us with rich descriptions from different angles. Financial advisors 
were selected to cover differences in age, gender, seniority and branch/geographical location. 




Interviews were framed by prior documentary and web site analysis. The interviews proceeded 
as a dialogue (Kvale, 1996) centred on narratives of unfolding events (Czarniawska, 1997).
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The majority of the interviews lasted for 1.5 hours. Each interview concluded with the subject 
filling in a simple quantitative mapping survey on sales practices. We also conducted non-
participant observations; took photographs (used as data in presentations to the firm) during 
guided tours by our hosts, and as well as engaginged in informal discussions. Thus, we had 
ample data on the various phases of sales pre- and post crisis from the different perspectives of 
managers and employees (Forseth, Røyrvik & Clegg, 2013).  
In order to get viewpoints from a macro level, we interviewed four members of the Board of 
the Finance Sector Union of Norway, a director of the Norwegian Financial Services 
Employers' Association and an advisor to the Financial Supervisory Authority in Norway. We 
reviewed extensive documentation generated in relation to financial sales, including strategy 
documents, memos, performance reports, institutional self-presentations, annual reports and 
union members' magazines. The data also comprised public reports and clippings from business 
papers on sales of financial instruments, and cases launched by small savers/consumer bodies 
in the courts. We accessed naturally occurring data by presenting and discussing results on 
sales rhetoric and practices in focus groups, four workshops and seminars of managers, 
employees and union members in the case banks (2007, 2008, 2009, 2013), as well as a 
meeting at the Finance Sector Union of Norway. These were useful in validating and revising 
the accounts that we were forming. Through these exchanges we elaborated our interpretations 
and overall perspective. On this basis we exposed our ideas to further commentary at 
international conferences and gained valuable feedback (authors, authors). In total, we collected 
a considerable amount of data, collected over several years in an intensive process.  
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The process of data analysis and interpretation proceeded iteratively (Alvesson & Kärreman, 
2011). Inspired by@Adhering to the founding principles of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967), the team‘s interpretive processes were very “hands on”, coding and analysing data, both 
individually and in collaboration, in several rounds, before re-entering the field to collect 
supplementary data and validate preliminary findings. We sought to capture ante-narratives 
from the multiple plurivocality of accounts circulating in fragments (Billig, 1996). We 
generated narrative themes recurring across various categories of members, tracking changes in 
sensemaking, analysing them as figure against the ground of shifts in formal narration.  
The Brave New World of Sales 
Frontline financial service personnel advise and sell, and being a seller was celebrated before 
the crisis. According to the industry view, “the financial industry believes all customers realize 
that advisors are really sellers, but to call themselves 'sellers' will have impact on their 
professional pride” (Dagens Næringsliv, 6 March, 2009). One interpretation of this statement is 
that advisor has a more neutral and positive connotation than seller. Financial advisors were 
first monitored on a few performance sales indicators in the 1990s with the number of 
indicators increasing over time to the wide range of (sales) indicators used today. Some 
experienced Customer Representatives (Insurance, Team A and B, 2006) talked in a pejorative 
way about competitive, brazen rookies, “vacuum cleaner sellers”, increasing sales by cutting 
corners and behaving in an unethical manner. Sales, sales, sales became the new mantra and 
financial instruments were a key element in the new sales culture in financial institutions. 
Managers tended not to dwell on the technicalities, stressing that too much technical 
information could make the dialogue with customers more difficult and time consuming, 




Our sales manager came back and was very happy after an encounter with some customers who were 
short on liquidity and wanted to re-finance. He had advised them to get a fixed rent serial loan, not pay 
any instalments, and invest their new loan in a financial instrument. This is nothing but a ‘kinder-egg’, he 
exclaimed, [referring to a children’s chocolate egg with three wishes come true: a surprise, a small toy 
and chocolate,]. I told him, this was unethical – you cannot do this… and he was angry with me… almost 
harassed me, and then I was told to come to his office and he asked if I really was suitable for this job. 
(Financial Advisor), Case 1, Bank A, 2008) 
Financial instruments were presented as “magic” products with probable high returns for 
customers. Advisors were not all sanguine about this aspect of their culture: “The one-eyed 
sales culture made me feel uneasy”, said one Financial Advisor (case 1, Bank A, 2009). ‘There 
was a lot of pushing of products’ before the crisis and little advice that if funds invested fell to 
a certain per cent of value, they could be terminated. Some qualms were expressed:  
I warned about financial instruments - that they should be forbidden – early on. I was scolded – harassed 
by my manager at an in-house meeting for having the lowest scores on investments [in financial 
instruments], and accused of not understanding what we were doing. Today these products are banned – 
we are not allowed to offer them any longer. (Senior Financial Advisor, Case1, Bank A, 2011) 
Before the crisis, those financial advisors who resisted selling financial instruments were 
marginalized. As this financial advisor put it: “If it hadn't been for the crisis, these products 
would have yielded a high profit and gone sky high, and I would have stood there as a fool”. It 
turned out that he was not the only one who was unable to understand the new products that 
were being marketed: “...nobody had really understood this product” created by “financial 
acrobats” in Wall Street (McDonald & Robinson, 2009, Tett, 2010). 
Phase 1: Before the jolt, in a remote corner of the global world 
A manager claimed sales should drive organizational behaviours in a competitive environment 
(Strategic Manager, Case 2, Bank C, 1998). Incentive schemes, performance indicators and 
individual coaching from team-leaders were directed towards this goal. Some employees 
welcomed the new sales demands as a challenge, while others were concerned about the 
downsides: “It has become so fixated on sales that it has gone completely to the head of the 




top sellers, but that is neither valued nor recorded” (Customer Representative, Insurance, team 
A, 2005). Other colleagues talked about unintended consequences such as mis-selling (selling 
inappropriate products for the customer) and over-selling (selling more product than the 
customer could afford). When asked in retrospect “if they had been advising customers to 
invest in financial instruments”, one Financial Advisor replied rhetorically: “If we advised our 
customers? We were pressured to sell [such products]” (Financial Advisor, Case 1, Bank B, 
2010). 
When the GFC first jolted these organizations, the managers in our sample emphasized that 
“their” financial institution had good systems and attitudes to risk-taking and had pursued a 
conservative risk practice. They spoke of incidents where they suffered some minor losses and 
that they had been “lucky and clever”. The sense of luck and cleverness was seen to be absent 
from some other financial institutions in Europe that the informants insisted had taken greater 
risks. Perhaps financial institutions in the Nordic countries financial institutions were not as 
culpable as Wall Street and elsewhere, nor as jeopardized as institutions and experiencing a 
crisis of liquidity (Engelstad, 2013), but tales of Nordic financial institutions mis-selling and 
over-selling began to circulate in official enquiries and press reports (The Financial 
Supervisory Authority, Norway, 2008). In 2009 when we raised the issues, one CEO first 
emphasized the importance of the demand side:  
It's quite interesting this debate on over-selling – because it has two sides to it. It has a customer side 
because customers got very concerned about return and fancy products. You had innovative players in the 
market that came up with a brand new product – and loyal customers came to us and said: But look what 
they’ve got! You must be able to come up with something similar – shipping, limited partnership units in 
Russia – very exciting! Why don’t you have something like that to offer us? If you fail to provide it, we 
do not bother to trade here. In a way this was half of the euphoria, right? (CEO, Case 1, Bank A, 
2008)  
Demand from wealthy customers and fear of losing out in the competitive race created a 




The other half, it's nothing to hold back – this was a very profitable product and the bank was very geared 
to selling it. In sum, it was such a cocktail that is like most cocktails: Gives a slight hangover after some 
time. But I think it was also a picture of a Norwegian economy really booming, rather than Norwegian 
banks sitting in the driver's seat and sort of pushing their customers. (CEO, Case 1, Bank A, 2008) 
Although this manager admitted that the bank profited from the financial instruments and 
talked about the times before the crisis as “bit of a party”, he underscored the importance of 
external factors driving behaviour such as the “booming economy” and then the “biggest 
downturn in the U. S. since 1929-30”. The bank had offered financial instruments on the 
premise of a low risk profile but there is always a risk with any product, he added. To 
underscore his argument he elaborated how one of the senior managers was one of the largest 
buyers, who would not have invested that much “if he had known that this was a shitty deal, 
right?” . The manager also introduced the the metaphor of a “cocktail” to characterize the 
situation. Cocktails can be delicious, but they can also cause a hangover.  
It was not only managers who exhibited wilful blindness and did denial, according to one shop 
steward (Case 1, Bank B, 2011): he claimed that many customers knew what they were doing 
with their dreams of easy money. Denial and surprise after the financial crisis were nothing but 
retrospective rationalizations, he suggested: customers sought to avoid appearing fools. 
Managers and financial advisors alike underscored how investors who bought early were smart 
and experienced, earning a profit. It was when they started selling financial instruments to “Mr 
and Mrs Jones” that things really went wrong, because they could not afford to loose their 
money (Case 1, Bank A, 2010).  
After the crisis it was easy to use advisors as scapegoats. In his defence one financial advisor 
noted that he was only doing what corporate sales strategies required: was it his fault if he was 
respectful of the moral order that prevailed in the culture? “It [financial instrument] was 
regarded as a top product. We [advisors] are being blamed for not having thorough knowledge. 




‘cowboy’?” (Financial advisor, Case 1, Bank A, 2010). From managers and employees alike 
we heard accounts of individual co-workers labelled “cowboys”: cheeky, brazen, competitive 
individuals, who were motivated by bonuses that, especially in the private banking sector, 
could double their salary through successful sales of these financial instruments. One shop 
steward (Case 2, Bank C, 2012) underscored that it was easy to blame financial advisors when 
it was management that jumped on the bandwagon and forced the employees to sell, yet 
managed to evade responsibility. Individual team-leaders and sales managers were also 
scapegoated: 
... Everyone knows that if you stand and hold a carrot in front of a runner, he runs even faster for a 
period. It works in the short term, but not in the long term. When it turned into over-selling and mis-
selling I think there were managers – often management that had an overly short-term focus.     
(Human Resources Manager, Case 2, Bank D, 2010) 
One financial advisor told us that just before the crisis a ‘cowboy’ sales manager was hired who 
cultivated an aggressive sales culture (Case 1, Bank A, 2008). Sales managers had to rank their 
staff’s effort, highlighting advisors' scores on sales and investment. Results were displayed. 
Normalization, the arrangement of performance outcomes in a graphical form, is a powerful 
technology of control: the positive outliers are a positive example to all and negative outliers a 
stigma. Managers admitted that using such visualizations of key performance indicators was 
one of the strategies encouraging what became known as mis-selling. One manager said: “We 
had a sales culture cheering good sales. Who were then responsible for customers having bad 
experiences dealing with us? The financial advisor who sold the product or the employer who 
organized the incentives and cultivated a culture?” (Human Resources Manager, Case 2, Bank 
C, 2012) 
In the past, bankers had been socialized within a “credit culture” where the “sexiest thing in the 
world is a spread-sheet” (Vice President Sales, Case 1, 2011). Maintaining bank and individual 




number and volume of savings (investments), number and volume of insurance, referrals to 
insurance, referring customers to the mortgage brokerage department, were added as kpi’s. 
Measuring outcomes encouraged focusing on selling as a process (Case 1, Bank A, 2011). The 
number of scheduled customer encounters became an important figure. Discussing sales 
strategies at a trade union seminar in 2009, financial advisors complained that they felt this 
constant monitoring was a violation of their professionalism, yet their managers claimed it was 
necessary in order to keep them sales-focused. The industry became increasingly oriented 
towards innovating and selling new financial products.     
Phase 2: After the jolt, a period of re-orientation and a shift to “right selling” 
The crisis was a significant jolt for Nordic financial institutions: even if profitable, they had to 
cope with a tarnished image characterised by what became known as mis-selling and over-
selling. One headline on Case 2, Bank C from our sample of media clippings read like this: 
“Financial instruments sold to 80 year old lady with dementia” (Business paper Dagens 
Næringsliv, 12 February 2009). Case banks, as well as other Nordic players, received much 
negative media coverage regarding small savers’ cases taken to court by consumer bodies.  
Financial institutions rely on European directives, the Basel accords, as well as the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directives (MIFID), a European Union law from 2007 harmonising the 
regulation of investment services across member states. Even though Norway (in contrast to 
Denmark and Sweden) is not a member of the EU, the country aligns itself with these 
imperatives. Additionally, instead of waiting for the authorities to impose new regulation, the 
industry had started to certify financial advisors in order to work on the sales culture 
proactively. Financial advisors in Norway had to pass a comprehensive, written exam including 
questions about derivatives and ethics, as well as a practical test in which the candidate has to 




Armed with the new insight that the changed regulatory environment provided, one manager 
concluded that  
The downsides of the sales culture came to the fore – we had sold [financial instruments] to customers 
who should never have invested in them, or provided advice based on an incentive model founded on 
how to optimize [the advisors'] wallet rather than the profitability of the customer. (Human Resources 
Manager, Case 2, Bank C, 2012)  
Increased corporate self-awareness led managers to distance themselves from earlier accounts 
shirking responsibility. 
One aspect has been to sort out cases of mis-selling where we were involved – we still do... Then it was 
time to look at incentives – because we had a sales culture praising high sales … and we were the 
architects behind the incentive system. (Human Resources Manager, Case 2, Bank C, 2012) 
The sensemaking shifted from externalization and individualization to consideration of their 
role as ‘architects’ of incentive schemes and sales cultures.  
Now, it’s not just about selling, but ‘right selling’. You are not clever if you over-sell. You have to know 
the products in detail… You have to pull them apart – that is why it is not easy to be good at this. 
(Financial Advisor, Case 1, Bank A, 2010)   
After the crisis jolted the culture and its ideology of sales, the image of the super seller was 
downplayed and the image of a service-oriented advisor celebrated. Other financial advisors 
noted, however that “it is not as simple as shift to ‘right-selling’, there is just as much pushing 
[of products] now” (Financial Advisor, Case1, Bank B, 2010). “Right selling” (matching sales 
products to customer requirements, income and investment profile), was emphasised by 
employees, trade union representatives and managers in stark contrast to the pre-crisis period 
when “big packages of products were thrown at the customers”, to quote a Shop Steward (Case 
1, Bank B, 2011). A financial advisor elaborated on these changes:  
Now there is more focus on being advisor in the sales of saving products. We are done selling big 
packages [of complex financial products]. Our primary mission is no longer sales [sic]… now it is team-
related bonuses and a focus on sales and satisfied customers. (Financial Advisor, Case 1, Bank A, 
2010) 




On the strategic level we have defined the 4 C's: Customer, credit, costs and capital. We talk about 
customers as the capital C, and emphasize that this is very important and that we have a vision about 
becoming the most customer oriented bank in the Nordic countries. (Vice President, Case 1, Bank 
B, 2010) 
Customers were celebrated as “capital C” discursively. Corporate rhetoric sought to increase 
trust while still improving competitive edge. On webpages and in commercial campaigns 
finance houses claimed that they excelled in the “art of customer care” (bank web-site). 
Informants explained to us that “we behave like gregarious animals and copy what the others 
do” (Manager, Case 2, Bank C, 2011), in terms of products, concepts and slogans. Isomorphism 
is rife. 
Not all industry insiders were enamoured of the new rhetoric. One banker said: “We have never 
been customer oriented” (Manager ICT, Case 2, Bank C, 2011). Others claimed they had 
always been concerned with reputation and image. One financial advisor claimed his behaviour 
towards customers after the GFC had not changed because he had been customer oriented all 
along. Renewed interest in customer orientation was mostly corporate rhetoric, he said, a view 
colloquially supported by a shop steward as a way of “covering their ass” (Case 1, Bank B, 
2011).  
Financial advisors agreed in response to an email survey prior to a union seminar, that “We still 
have a long way to go before every part of the bank is customer-oriented”. The rhetoric was 
widely circulated, however. One top-level manager sought to convince us that after the GFC 
customer satisfaction was the only important indicator for monitoring encounters with financial 
advisors. Despite these claims, often couched in seductive rhetoric in corporate brochures, 
subsequently we found other parameters being monitored. A wide range of key performance 
indicators believed to contribute to increased performance and sales were still measured: “We 




If it was up to me, we would only measure three to four things” (Vice President, Case 1, Bank 
B, 2010). 
A customer orientation, promoted as a shift to more “right selling”, resulted in new 
performance indicators related to “the moment of truth” – as one bank labelled the interaction 
with customers. These gave the individual advisor feedback on performance, measured in terms 
of customer satisfaction with the encounter, providing management rank orders of customers’ 
satisfaction with encounters. “Management by customers” (Fuller & Smith, 1991) translated 
into enhanced surveillance and disciplinary control of those low on the distributional curve of 
customer satisfaction. Customer satisfaction can be affected by an infinite number of variables, 
such as the identities attributed to the bank officer (male/female; young/old; black/white; 
attractive/unattractive, native/non-native, etc.) and the outcome of the visit (approval or denial 
of loan). For any number of reasons an officer might be perceived as a negative outlier in 
normal distribution used to stigmatize the tail.  
Discussion  
We have used examples of organizational storytelling to chart the transition from a world 
celebrating sales to its opprobrium and strategic repair work. The theoretical concept of 
environmental jolt captures the unexpected, unplanned and uncertainty-inducing (   ), and might 
contribute to biased interpretation in the direction of a natural catastrophe that is not man-made. 
Some of our informants compared the crisis to a tsunami with dramatic, overall changes outside 
the control of incumbents in the financial industry. First, we might indeed question how 
unexpected the financial crisis was, as some informants admitted there were warning signs. 
Second, politicians and regulators made changes to regulation acts and lay the ground for de-
regulation and the increased financialization.We investigated significant shifts legitimating 




standards for sales. Meyer (1982) underscored jolts as occasions for overall strategic change, 
illustrating how managers celebrated existing ideologies in their responses to jolts, as we found 
in the first phase. . Accounts subsequently changed longitudinally after the jolt. Our data 
reveals managers’ re-framing and reconsidering accounts of strategies and practices andfrom 
which w. We identified common patterns in tTheir accounts had some common themes,. ?but 
they also differed according to level and position within the institutions. We illustrated how 
financial advisors and union representatives were more critical of the enhanced pressure to sell.  
 
Accounts subsequently changed longitudinally after the jolt. Our data reveals managers’ re-
framing and reconsidering accounts of strategies and practices. We illustrated how financial 
advisors and union representatives were more critical of the enhanced pressure to sell.  
 
As Maclean et al. (2012) note, stories about failure differ markedly from those of success. 
Failure is accompanied by attributions of blame. Financial managers initially played a blame 
game regarding sales practices, making excuses, simplifying temporal changes, dramatizing 
external factors, events and people as responsible, deemphasizing corporate strategies and 
practices. Blame and responsibility were attributed to others rather than accepting personal 
responsibility. Booming economies, critical timing, and single actors were emphasized rather 
than the complex interplay of a network of actors and factors. The immediate post-GFC 
rhetoric celebrated existing financial sales ideologies and practices and contradicted any critical 
voices coming from front line operations.  
As the effects of the crisis unfolded, practices of mis-selling and malpractice were revealed. 




labelled “cowboys”. Later, the role of incentive schemes, sales practices and to some extent, 
strategies, were acknowledged. The GFC jolted interpretive horizons leading to more self-
reflexive and critical views of aggressive sales practices and alchemic financial instruments. 
Managers now recognized a ‘culture of greed’ (cf. Madrick, 2011) had developed and that 
incentive schemes and other strategies aimed at cultivating enhanced sales were responsible. 
Not only did differently situated actions generate different vocabularies of motive (Mills, 
1940); differently situated agents did so as well (Whittle and Mueller, 2012). A complex 
morality play emerged in which initially it was the jolt itself that was blamed, then agencies 
less remote and more identifiable as knowledge of organizational practices was increasingly 
made public.  
In a second response managers used what we term conceptual plurivocality, with multiple 
interpretations (Thatchenkery, 1992) infusing new meaning into old concepts, particularly 
customer orientation. In the 90s, this term was related to the “inward-oriented” organization of 
services (what was convenient for the bank rather than the customers) (Manager, Case 2, Bank 
C, 1999). In the period prior to the GFC the focus was on notions such as “shareholder value” 
and “value based management” (Røyrvik 2011) offering profit for both customers and 
shareholders. In the aftermath of the crisis, the notion of customer orientation was transformed, 
increasingly being used as a catchword to describe changes in (sales) practices. Some financial 
advisors were critical towards the new customer turn, claiming it was mostly rhetoric. One of 
them said that he had been customer-oriented all along, and athat proof of this was that he had 
refused to sell financial instruments to his customers before the crisis. Today the needs of the 
customer are positioned as a pivotal concern open to flexible interpretation..
3
  Customer need is 
not fixed but context dependent, varying both among different customers and from situation to 
situation. These needs are co-created by financial advisors, operating according to varying 
                                                             
3
 Respondents initially largely asserted customer service had been their prime concern all along, even before the 




banking concepts and a concern with the most profitable customers. Customer orientation 
comprises a conceptual plurivocality providing meaningful flexibility with room for strategic 
and rhetorical manoeuvring across all three stages. Initially, respondents asserted customer 
service had, all along, largely been their prime concern, even before the GFC. We encountered 
only one banker exprssing doubts that this was the case. 
Finally, we introduced examples that demonstrate the third response, which we labelled 
embellishment, due to significant shifts that occurred in legitimating financial sales practices as 
well as the emergence of new strategies for re-furbishing brand image to regain customer trust. 
After the onset of the GFC, the new concept of “right selling”, as opposed to what became 
known as “mis-selling”, was introduced to demonstrate a new era had begun. Before the GFC, 
the emphasis was on incentives schemes directed to sales, whereas afterwards the advisor role 
was celebrated. One manifestation was the creation of a programme of training for financial 
advisors presented as evidence of an enhanced concern with ethics in sales and greater 
awareness of the needs of the customers. The programme was a way of legitimating a new 
ideology and of de-legitimating that associated with the crisis, yet, at the same time, managers 
underscored that all advisors are sellers and that cash-back or payback remains the underlying 
expectation. The changes targeted major shifts in brand and image, largely through rhetorical 
devices, while in practice little changed.    
In the introduction we spelled out three important parallel changes that took place after the 
deregulation of the financial industry, although not in parallel at exactly the same time and in 
the same way in every local branch/context: Tlocal knowledge was increasingly displaced by 
technical competence with computer programmes, aggressive selling tactics and a more 
meritocratic ethos characterized the new ethos. We found the same elements in our material, 
yet iIt was the changes in the sales cultures in a more aggressive direction that were most 
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salient. This, which may not be too surprising given the relatively peripheral position of our 
cases in terms of creating, rather than “just selling”, the controversial financial products. The 
articleOur material also documents how selling practices and rhetoric related to sales changed 
again as an effect of the GFC jolt. In campaigns to refurbish their image, regulation and new 
ethical standards of selling were introduced, although we rather surprisingly found that the 
pressure to sell did not decrease.. 
.  The theoretical concept of environmental jolt has connotation to a natural catastrophe with 
fundamental changes and re-structuring. In line with this, it was interesting to note how 
managers and employeesy informants talked about the coming of the crisis as a tsunami with 
dramatic and global changes outside the control of incumbents in the financial industry. Some 
told us there were warning signs, but many informants still claimed that the crisis was 
unexpected. The crisis was a resulted from of anthe interplay of manyseveral factors, especially 
those that  but Wall Street bankers had invented the financial instruments that propelledwere 
networked world-wide and contributed to the crash. Our informants did not loose their jobs as 
did their colleagues in the banks that went baenkcrupt in Lehman Brothers, but they had to 
cope with some of the consequences of the crisis.   It also struck us that that it was difficult to 
grasp and make sense of the exact effects and changes post crisis. First, there were rather small 
changes over time rather than one revolutionary change post crisis. Second, the jolt manifested 
itself in different ways in local contexts, and the accounts differed according to level and 
position within the institutions. We illustrated how financial advisors and union representatives 
were more critical of the enhanced pressure to sell. there were differences in responses e.g. 
contributed to           . For some financial advisors in small, local branches, the events at Wall 
Street seemed far away from their everyday workday; in their view , and they had just been 
doing their job, even if it involved offering complex financial products “at low risk”. Post 




Secondly, compiling the accounts of our informants resulted in a complex and sometimes 
contradictory picture and it was difficult it was a challenge for us to sort outdistinguish between 
actual changes and rhetoric about the changes. : at one instant we were told that after the crisis, 






We have described how Iincreased regulation from the authorities contributed to new demands 
for financial advisors and  and financial institutions alike,. , butalbeit that these regulations 
have been termed were modest (Løyning 2014  sos        ). Besides,  and how a system of 
authorization of financial advisors developed from within the financial industry, focusing on 
“right selling”, ethics  and new practices. For the employees, however, the new positive 
customer orientation has not reduced the pressure to sell but has contributed to intensification 
of their work, producing more paperwork through enhanced reporting and documentation. 
Enhanced monitoring and disciplinary control is camouflaged by the shift to a customer 
orientation. Mapping customer satisfaction is now added to existing performance parameters 
related to products and sales, illustrating the ambivalence of a concept presented as a proof of a 
positive development. The cult(ure) of the customer and the discourse of enterprise (Miller & 
Rose, 1997, du Gay & Salaman, 1992) characterize the turn to customer orientation. The 
increased discipline, monitoring and control of advisors through record-keeping means there is 
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actually less time to spend talking to customers, even if the customer is said to be pivotal, 
customer-orientation the guiding light, and customer satisfaction the metric. To sum up, the 
crisis manifested itself differently in various local contexts that were far from the epicentre of 
the jolt. Thus, there is not one single diagnosis that applies to all the sites that we researched. 
There was no revolutionary change, but small changes that sought in order to rebuild image and 
trust in the sales practices and the financial institutions. 
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Conclusions 
The tacit rules of the financial services game became much more evident as a result of the GFC 
breaching what had become expectations of normal business practices. An unfolding event, it 
jolted what had become the ideological basis of business as usual. After the jolt was recognised 
managers initially externalized blame, making excuses that enrolled other actors and factors in 
their account s making use of simplification in their account of sales and the crisis. They did so 
by making use of simplifications and: we think of this process as the construction of a blame 
game. Leaders near the epicentre of a jolt typically do this (Reinhardt & Rogoff, 2009; Palma, 
2009). Secondly, they practised conceptual plurivocality by infusing old concepts with new 
content,  with the concept notion of customer orientation being an example. Finally, 
embellishment shows managers introducing new measures, rhetorical figures, sales strategies 
and practices as responses to the jolt to prove that an era of right selling had begun, one which 
translated into enhanced surveillance and disciplinary control of employees, albeit not 
explicitly acknowledged as such. 
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AThe accounts of the impacts of the crisis differed according to level and position within the 
institutions. We illustrated how financial advisors and union representatives were more critical 
of the enhanced pressure to sell and emphasized how the turn to right-selling and re-orientation 
post crisis involved some actual changes but also rhetoric and “newspeak”. Revolutionary 
changes were as hard to depictfew and far between in a context, it was rather a question of 
piece-meal changes and modest regulation.    
The theoretical contribution of this paper is to show how, recursively, jolts threatened local 
legitimations of management practice and became the occasion for creative sensemaking that 
rationalized failure, apportioned responsibility and maintained legitimation, whilst 
simultaneously deepening existing disciplinary measures under cover of a new rhetoric of the 
customer. While earlier accounts of jolts by Meyer (1982) saw them as occasions for overall 
strategic change by organizations, we have investigated everyday practices unfolding over 
time, far removed from moments of strategy formulation, in order to grasp the nature of 
adaptation to jolts. Jolts disrupt everyday routinized processes and require members to develop 
new accounts of their practices as existing accounts are delegitimized. To the extent that jolts 
create strategic opportunities, these become materialized through everyday discourses as 
practices of evolving sensemaking.   
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List of interviewees post crisis in the key cases (for this paper) and at macro level 
Case 1: Nordic financial enterprise, personal banking 
     Length of employment institution Time in current job 
Central organization 
Vice President Sales   >   5     >   5 
Shop Steward    > 40     > 10 
Regional bank A, Norway (NOR) 
Chief Executive Officer  *     
Manager, Special Projects  > 10     <   5 
Frontline Sales Manager  > 25     > 10   
Financial Advisor   < 5     <   5 
Senior Financial Advisor  > 45     >   5? 
Senior Financial Advisor  > 20     > 15 
Chief Shop Steward   > 30     > 10? 
Shop Steward    > 10     > 5 
Regional bank B, Denmark (DK) 
Assistant Account Manager  > 20     > 10? 
Senior Financial Advisor   > 
Senior Financial Advisor 
Financial Advisors and  
Union Representative (4) 
Union Representative 
Union Representative 
Union Representative  >+ 5     > 




Shop Steward     
 
Case 2: Alliance of saving banks, personal banking 
     Length of employment institution Time in current job 
Regional bank C  
Human Resources Manager  >   5     > 5 
Manager at strategic level    > 25     > 20 
Manager at strategic level  > 10     < 5 
Former Branch Manager  > 30     < 5 
Chief Shop Steward   > 25     > 10 
 
Regional bank D 
Human Resources Manager  > 15     ? 
Chief Shop Steward   > 25     <  5 
* Due to reasons of anonymity the number of years are presented in five-year intervals                    
( > 5 = 5-10) and omitted for some informants who are easier to identify or due to lack of data. 
 
Macro level: 
The Finance Sector Union of Norway: 4 members of the Board,  
The Norwegian Financial Services Employers’ Association: 1 Director                                   
The Financial Supervisory Authority in Norway: 1 Advisor/Coordinator 
All had more than twenty years of employment within the financial industry in various 
positions. 
 
